Why Was Korihor Struck Dumb?

The Know

The trial of the antichrist Korihor came to a dramatic head when Korihor demanded of Alma, “If thou wilt show me a sign, that I may be convinced that there is a God, yea, show unto me that he hath power, and then will I be convinced of the truth of thy words” (Alma 30:43). Korihor had taught that “there should be no Christ,” no Messiah, and upon direct questioning, he even denied the existence of God.1

Alma pressed Korihor for evidence beyond his own word of his views and appealed to an abundance of testimonies for the existence of God (Alma 30:40–42). Perhaps realizing his own disadvantage because of the well-known requirement under biblical law of having two witnesses, Korihor demanded a sign—a common ancient practice of resolving a judicial case by divine ordeal (Deuteronomy 19:15). After Alma warned him against testing God, Korihor still insisted, “I will deny, except ye shall show me a sign” (Alma 30:45). Reluctantly, Alma declared, “This will I give unto thee for a sign, that thou shalt be struck dumb,” which immediately happened (Alma 30:49–50).

In a thorough exploration of the legal aspects of Korihor’s trial, John W. Welch noted that cursing a legal opponent with speechlessness is attested in ancient Greek curses:

Of the more than a thousand “judicial [binding curses],” thirteen … ask the gods specifically to bind the tongue of a legal opponent in such a way that the speechless adversary would lose the case. … An additional twenty-one known curses … make reference to the voice, tongue, or words of the legal opponent, and many of these probably imply complete silencing of the accuser as well.2

Welch adds, “Evidence shows that people believed that these curses were sometimes actually fulfilled.”3 In an inscription from Delos dated to the third century BC, a litigant thanked the gods for “making the tongue silent in the mouth, from which (tongue) no one heard a word or an accusation.” Regarding Korihor’s case, Welch notes that this curse served as an appropriately talionic punishment. “Korihor’s punishment provides another good example of divinely executed talionic justice: his curse befits his crime. Because he had spoken evil, he was punished by being made unable to speak.” This makes sense since “in the ancient Near East, talionic justice was the rule,” as Welch further noted.4

Recently, Mark Alan Wright and Neal Rappleye have pointed out that talionic punishments were also known among pre-Columbian American civilizations. “Like those of the ancient Near East, Mesoamerican legal systems also often affixed talionic punishments to certain crimes.”5 For example, at the Aztec city of Texcoco, “talion law was applied to the false witness, probably much in the manner found in the Old Testament [see Deuteronomy 19:19]. He was punished as the accused would have been had he been guilty of the offense charged.”6 The talionic nature of Korihor’s punishment can thus be further illuminated when considered through a New World lens.7

Korihor derided the Nephite beliefs as “foolish things” that were the byproduct “of a frenzied mind.” And, he said, Nephite faith was merely “a foolish and a vain hope” resulting from “this derangement of [their] minds” due to “the silly traditions of their fathers” (Alma 30:13, 16, 31). In several Mayan languages, terms meaning “foolish,” “vain,” “silly,” “frenzy,” and “deranged” were similar (or even identical) to the words used for being deaf, dumb, or mute. For instance, in Mopan, b’es means both “silly, fool” and “mute, dumb.” In Yucatec Mayan, ah ch’uch’ means “dumb, mute” and “silly, crazy, lunatic, demented or deranged.”8 Thus, within a New World linguistic context, Korihor’s fate mirrored his false accusations. As Wright and Rappleye observed, Korihor “ridicules the Nephites for being ah ch’uch’ (in its sense of ‘silly,’ ‘foolish,’ ‘frenzied,’ and ‘deranged’) and is then cursed to become ah ch’uch’ himself (in its sense of being ‘struck dumb’).”9

Furthermore, Korihor specifically denounced Nephite prophecies and mocked Nephite priests for believing in “their dreams and their whims and their visions and their pretended mysteries” (Alma 30:14, 28). These accusations also take on an ironic twist of talionic fate within a New World setting. According to Wright and Rappleye, in Yucatec Mayan the word wayak’ is used to refer to prophecies, dreams, visionary dreams, and even fantasies and illusions—as well as to signs or symbols. As such, if we look at Korihor’s speech from a Yucatec perspective, “Korihor mocks the Nephites for relying on wayak’ (in its sense of ‘dreams’ and ‘visions’) but demands a wayak’ (in its sense of ‘sign’) before he will believe.”10

Moreover, the root of wayak’ is way, which also can refer to dreams or visions and is used in an expression—ah way xibalbá—that means “man who speaks with the devil.”11 Despite having mocked the Nephites for their dreams and visions (way), in his confession Korihor admits to having had a vision himself, wherein “the devil … appeared unto me in the form of an angel, … and he taught me that which I should say” (Alma 30:53). In effect, Korihor confessed to being an ah way xibalbá.12

The Why

The detailed account of Korihor’s case powerfully teaches several enduring lessons. As John W. Welch has explained:

Warnings that God will adhere to this principle [of talionic justice] when judging human conduct are plentiful in both the Old Testament and the Book of Mormon, and it is fair to say that no principle is more fundamental to the concept of justice in biblical times than the requirement that the punishment should somehow match, relate to, or balance out the nature of the crime or wrongdoing itself. Talionic justice achieved a sense of poetic justice, rectification of imbalance, relatedness between the nature of the wrong and the fashioning of the remedy, and appropriateness in determining the measure or degree of punishment.13

It is therefore no surprise that when carefully analyzed, Korihor’s fate indeed adheres to talionic principles of broad jurisprudential significance. From a modern perspective, Korihor’s punishment may seem extreme and unfair, especially since Korihor ultimately confessed.14 But on closer examination, the talionic nature of the punishment illustrates that from ancient perspectives, Korihor’s punishment was appropriate to the crimes he had committed. As Wright and Rappleye noted, “Korihor’s punishment fits his crime like a glove: he is cursed to become the very things he falsely and derisively accused the Nephites of being.”15

Moreover, it should also be kept in mind that Korihor’s death—being “run upon and trodden down” as he went forth among the Zoramites in Antionum—was not a direct outcome of his legal case in Zarahemla (Alma 30:59). As Welch noted, “God’s justice, it would seem, had been fully satisfied by the silencing of Korihor. There was also probably no legal basis for a judge to require Korihor’s death at that time. Therefore, it seems more likely that Korihor’s death was extralegally caused by the Zoramites.” Welch proposes three reasons why the Zoramites may have summarily executed Korihor, including the possibility that it was “because he had been cursed by a god and was therefore a pariah, or one marked with evil spirits.”16 Such would be consistent with many ancient cultures. Indeed, physical and mental maladies such as madness, frenzy, and becoming mute and deaf were all feared as signs of divine disfavor among the Maya. For example, the Ritual of the Bacabs, a Yucatecan Maya text, uses an idiom for “I curse you” that more literally means “to strike someone dumb.”17

Finally, Mormon draws a spiritual message from Korihor’s death, saying, “And thus we see the end of him who perverteth the ways of the Lord.” But in issuing this warning, Mormon does not describe Korihor’s fate as being caused by the Lord but rather says it was caused by the devil: “And thus we see that the devil will not support his children at the last day, but doth speedily drag them down to hell” (Alma 30:60). God’s justice, on the other hand, is eternally loving, necessary, proper, and beneficial, and He will provide ample opportunity for repentance and mercy to have full sway before any demands of justice and natural consequences take effect.

• 1. Alma 30:12, 37–38. On whether Korihor was really an atheist in the modern sense, see Scripture Central, “Was Korihor Really an Atheist? (Alma 30:37–38),” KnoWhy 532 (September 19, 2019).
• 2. John W. Welch, The Legal Cases of the Book of Mormon (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2008), 290–293, quote on page 291.
• 3. Welch, Legal Cases, 291. For an Old Testament example of a talionic legal punishment that was expected to be carried out by God rather than the state, see the ordeal of bitter water in Numbers 5:11–31.
• 4. Welch, Legal Cases, 289, 291. For an explanation of talionic punishments, see pages 338–348.
• 5. Mark Alan Wright and Neal Rappleye, “‘Dumb’ Puns in Alma 30: A Mesoamerican Twist on Korihor’s Talionic Punishment,” BYU Studies 62, no. 3 (2023): 143.
• 6. John M. Seus, “Aztec Law,” American Bar Association Journal 55, no. 8 (1969): 738.
• 7. Admittedly, it is impossible to know to what extent wordplays based on New World languages might have been reflected in the original reformed Egyptian text of the Book of Mormon, as acknowledged by Wright and Rappleye, “‘Dumb’ Puns in Alma 30,” 137. Certainly, as the Nephites’ Old World languages were “handed down and altered … according to [the Nephites’] manner of speech,” they were likely influenced by indigenous American languages (Mormon 9:32–33). Exactly which languages influenced Nephite language and in what ways, however, remains unknown. For one hypothesis, see Brian D. Stubbs, Changes in Languages: From Nephi to Now, 2nd ed. (Blanding, UT: Four Corners Digital Design, 2020). In any case, awareness of these overlapping meanings within New World languages illuminates how this account would have been understood within the broader pre-Columbian cultural milieu the Nephites likely participated in.
• 8. See Wright and Rappleye, “‘Dumb’ Puns in Alma 30,” 145, for these and other examples.
• 9. Wright and Rappleye, “‘Dumb’ Puns in Alma 30,” 148.
• 10. Wright and Rappleye, “‘Dumb’ Puns in Alma 30,” 146, 148.
• 11. Wright and Rappleye, “‘Dumb’ Puns in Alma 30,” 146.
• 12. Wright and Rappleye, “‘Dumb’ Puns in Alma 30,” 147.
• 13. Welch, Legal Cases, 338–339.
• 14. Welch, Legal Cases, 293–295, discusses the inadequacy of Korihor’s confession and notes that in antiquity, confession was often required of those found guilty and did not typically relieve them of punishment for their crimes. See also Scripture Central, “Why Was Korihor Cursed with Speechlessness? (Alma 30:50),” KnoWhy 138 (July 7, 2016). Wright and Rappleye, “‘Dumb’ Puns in Alma 30,” 143, do note an exception in Aztec law, wherein ecclesiastical confession (paired with genuine penance) could be accepted in lieu of punishment by the state. If there were similar provisions in earlier Mesoamerican legal systems, it could explain why Korihor hoped Alma would ask God to lift his curse after he confessed (Alma 30:54). See Wright and Rappleye, “‘Dumb’ Puns in Alma 30,” 147.
• 15. Wright and Rappleye, “‘Dumb’ Puns in Alma 30,” 148.
• 16. Welch, Legal Cases, 298.
• 17. Wright and Rappleye, “‘Dumb’ Puns in Alma 30,” 144.